America's Missing Military Revolution

Imagine wanting to buy the latest iPhone, but instead of ordering it and receiving it right away, you have to spend years testing a model that, when it arrives, is already two generations old. And then your whole family will have to wait even longer to get the same phone, stuck with software from years earlier. It sounds crazy, but that's exactly how the Pentagon buys drones, software, and missiles: a process so slow that, by the time the technology reaches the soldiers, it's often already outdated. The argument here is harsh: the greatest technological power in history risks losing its military supremacy not because it lacks money, talent, or ideas, but because its procurement system operates like 1970s Soviet-style planning, shackled by rules designed to prevent corruption and waste, but which today stifle any real innovation. Anyone who thinks that “America is always ahead anyway” is seriously mistaken: the real risk for Washington is not losing a war, but losing the technological race that made it impregnable. Doug Beck, the author of this analysis, has experienced both sides of the coin: first as a manager at Apple, then as director of the Defense Innovation Unit, the body created by the Pentagon to bring Silicon Valley speed to the U.S. military. He recounts how, in 2015, the first meetings between innovators in jeans and generals in suits and ties seemed like two tribes incapable of understanding each other. Only when the dialogue became “bilingual” — with people who understood both the tech and military worlds — did the first results emerge: prototypes of drones and defense systems created in months instead of ten years. But the most powerful story is that of Saronic, a startup led by a former Navy SEAL. In 2024, it took part in a tender for new marine drones inspired by the Ukrainian ones that put the Russian fleet in the Black Sea in crisis. In just a few months, Saronic won, passed the tests, and secured a $392 million contract. Those drones were used in the operation in Iran, and in two years, the startup went from being unknown to being valued at over $9 billion. This miracle, however, is not the norm. While Ukraine produces and upgrades millions of drones a year, changing software every week to respond to the Russian offensive, the United States purchased only 4,000 in 2024. Even though they have launched programs for hundreds of thousands of units, the bureaucracy is so slow that most contracts still go to the traditional giants, and less than 3% of the budget goes to truly innovative technologies. Behind this sluggishness lies an absurd system of incentives: if you make a bad purchase, you can end up under investigation, but if soldiers lose because you played it too safe, no one is punished. Thus, the unwritten rule becomes: better no risk than to risk innovating. The real paradox is that, while private companies update their products every week and incentivize those who take calculated risks, the Pentagon rewards those who follow procedure, not those who find solutions that actually work in battle. Beck makes it clear that even the most recent reforms — flexible budgets, new authorities to bypass bureaucracy, incentives for innovation — are still too marginal: the bulk of the funds remain tied up in the same hands, and the changes are workarounds, not a real revolution. Turning the situation around requires courage: requiring each branch of the armed forces to spend at least 20% of its budget on new technologies, allowing products or software to be changed without having to ask Congress for permission every time, and introducing real incentives for those who take serious risks. It is also necessary to recognize that the strength of the United States is no longer solely national: much of the best software, components, and ideas come from allies, and closing ranks only risks isolating them. A radical idea that is often absent from the debate is this: the real risk today is not choosing the wrong prototype, but getting stuck while the rest of the world races ahead. Beck puts it plainly: “You have to choose to take risks today — with money, with careers, with procedures — so as not to risk the security of the entire country tomorrow.” The key takeaway is this: America will not lose the war because it lacks money or technology, but because it is afraid to take risks. If you’ve heard something that makes you think “this is my experience” or “I now think differently,” on Lara Notes, you can press I'm In: it’s not a like; it’s your way of saying that this idea is now yours. And if, in a few days, you find yourself telling someone the story of Saronic or the anecdote about the iPhone, on Lara Notes, you can tag those who were with you with Shared Offline: it's a way of saying that that conversation really mattered. This article is from Foreign Affairs and has saved you 19 minutes.