Are democracies losing the economic war? | Curtis Yarvin, Aaron Bastani, Hélène Landemore

What you hold in your hand right now probably exists thanks to a monarchy. Does that sound far-fetched? Curtis Yarvin, a serial provocateur, puts it this way: everything that truly works—from your iPhone to a Michelin-starred restaurant—depends on a pyramid with a single leader at the top. And if you look at human history, liberal democracy is just a tiny interlude compared to centuries of monarchical rule. Yet, the question that divides economists and politicians is a different one: Which system truly creates widespread prosperity—“open” democracies or regimes led by a few, or by just one? The argument that emerges from this debate represents a reversal of the view held by those who believe that democracy automatically means economic success: historically, liberal democracies have fostered innovation and prosperity more than other models, but today they are losing ground, and the reasons are not what you might imagine. Yarvin begins with Aristotle: rule by the many (democracy), by the few (oligarchy), or by one (monarchy). But he immediately launches an attack: “Democracy” is now just a word we use to mean “legitimate government.” Even North Korea is called the “Democratic People's Republic.” In reality, he argues, most of our institutions are oligarchies disguised as democracies, dominated by lawyers and cumbersome bureaucracies. Want to see a real system that works? Take Apple: there’s a CEO, and he’s the one who makes the decisions. China? A dictator. California, where Yarvin lives, is technically a democracy, but in practice, it's a one-party state. And if you think democracy is “the norm,” you're sorely mistaken: human history is made up of monarchies, and ours is just a brief bubble. Aaron Bastani, director of Navara Media, admits that, in the end, he too, managing a 25-person newsroom, is a kind of “king.” But he flips the question on its head: the right question is not which system creates the most GDP, but which system allows people to flourish the most. And here he brings up two weighty arguments: first, open societies produce high-quality information, which is essential for efficient markets—Hayek already said this a hundred years ago. If you have to lie to your bosses about factory performance, the system grinds to a halt. Second, in Europe, those who disagreed with those in power could flee and reinvent themselves elsewhere: John Locke and Thomas Hobbes are just two names, but the principle is clear. In China, under the Qing dynasty, those who were out of line were suppressed. This pluralism has driven Europe forward for centuries. Political scientist Hélène Landemore cites hard data: a study by Acemoglu and Robinson covering 150 countries over 40 years shows that liberal democracies outperform monarchies and autocracies in terms of long-term growth. The reason? “Inclusive” institutions: anyone can patent an idea, anyone can become an entrepreneur. And when mistakes are made, the system corrects itself: democratic resilience is the true strength, as demonstrated by the case of China and the tragedy of its one-child policy. So, then, how can we explain the Chinese boom? Here, the debate heats up. China has lifted 600 million people out of poverty, but, as Landemore points out, it has also done so by taking advantage of global markets created by democracies and replicating others' innovations. Furthermore, its growth is based on open economic institutions but closed political ones: this tension makes it fragile. Bastani adds: China can build thousands of miles of high-speed rail in a few years or conquer the solar panel market, but it is also the same machine that imposed the one-child policy, one of the worst decisions of the last century. And here’s the surprising detail: the person who conceived it was not a sociologist, but a rocket scientist. In other words, concentrating too much power risks producing both brilliant and disastrous decisions. One problem remains that affects everyone: democracies are excellent at correcting their own mistakes, but they are terrible at planning for the long term. Bastani puts it bluntly: “Our society is sick. We are incapable of thinking like our wise ancestors.” The real challenge of the future will be to determine whether we can design societies that function not only tomorrow, but a hundred years from now. In short: democracies have brought greater prosperity and innovation over the long term because they are inclusive, self-correcting, and allow for pluralism. However, they are losing the ability to act for the common good over the long term, while autocracies, although they may shine at times, risk making catastrophic mistakes. Democracy is not a free pass to success—it is an ongoing gamble on the ability to learn from one's mistakes. If you think democracy is just a matter of voting, perhaps it's time to reconsider everything from the ground up. If this discussion has resonated with you, on Lara Notes you can click I'm In: it's your way of saying that this idea now matters to you, that you no longer want to think about it the way you did before. And if you happen to discuss it with someone—perhaps citing the fact that 600 million Chinese have lifted themselves out of poverty or the quip about monarchies hiding behind tech companies—on Lara Notes, you can mark that conversation with Shared Offline: it's your way of saying that the exchange made an impact, not just online but in real life. This debate comes from the Institute of Art and Ideas. You've saved almost 50 minutes of video time and brought at least three new stories to the dinner table.