How to bolster the arsenal of democracy

In 2024, global military spending increased more than at any time since the Cold War. The European NATO member states alone, having realized how depleted their arsenals were during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, are set to add €300 billion per year to their military spending by the end of the decade. However, there is a truth that is often overlooked: it is not money that deters wars, but the actual ability to produce useful weapons, at the right time, with the right industry. The argument here is very clear: the way we conceive of military power—more budget, more deterrence—is now obsolete. Today, we need a defense industry that is agile, fast, software-driven, and capable of adapting to the wars of tomorrow, not those of yesterday. In the United States, this revolution has a clear face: new tech companies, often founded outside traditional channels, are reshaping the rules of the game. Take Palmer Luckey, founder of Oculus and later of Anduril: as an outsider from Silicon Valley, he has created autonomous drones and defense systems that are updated every week, not every decade as was the case with the old defense giants. Luckey recounts how, after selling Oculus to Facebook, he decided to enter the military sector because he saw that traditional suppliers could no longer keep up. One detail is particularly thought-provoking: In just a few years, he and his team went from idea to prototype and managed to sell advanced surveillance systems directly to the U.S. military. Meanwhile, Europe's industrial giants are still moving at a snail's pace, hampered by bureaucracy and endless procurement cycles. In 2023, it took Germany more than six months just to order new Patriot missiles, while companies like Anduril or Palantir demonstrate that software can change everything in weeks—not years. The result? Today, the winner is not the one who spends the most, but the one who can adapt the fastest. However, there is an aspect that is often overlooked: this arms race risks fueling new technological dependencies, this time on the United States rather than on Russia. If Europe does not develop its own defense tech industry, it risks remaining a “customer” rather than a key player, even if it spends billions. The key phrase to remember is this: The wars of the future will be decided not by budget, but by how quickly your defense industry can adapt. If this shift in perspective resonated with you, on Lara Notes you can press I'm In: it's not a like, but your way of saying that this idea now matters to you. And if you use this story—perhaps by talking about Palmer Luckey or the additional $300 billion per year—you can tag the people who were with you using Shared Offline: it’s a way to capture an important conversation, not just share a link. That was The Economist: I saved you over six minutes of reading time.