The World's Only Real Hope of Maintaining Order

When you think of the world order, you might imagine grand conferences, solemn treaties, or the power of superpowers imposing rules from the center. But today, the real surprise is this: the future of the global order will not be defined by a single leader, nor by an increasingly rigid UN, but by a fluid network of “concerts” between regions and powers, a bit like geopolitical jam sessions where no one is really conducting, but everyone has to play together if they want the music to continue. Does it seem chaotic? It is. And that is precisely why it could work better than any other model we have seen so far. The common view is that only a central authority — a superpower or a major international organization — can hold the world together. But this belief no longer holds up: power is spreading too quickly, the new regional powers are determined to go it alone, and the old machinery of global governance (including the UN) is getting more and more bogged down, amid cross-vetoes and paralysis. The argument here is radical: the only real hope of avoiding chaos is not to return to a centralized order, but to embrace a new architecture made up of many centers — strong regional poles, connected by small informal groups that coordinate major decisions, without trying to make everyone the same. Imagine a network of regional councils — the EU, ASEAN, the African Union, the Arab League, Mercosur — that solve problems in their own areas, and above them a “Global Concert” where the world's heavyweights (the United States, China, India, Russia, the EU) sit together with representatives of the regions. It is not a world parliament, nor a standing meeting of heads of state: it is a streamlined, always-on directorate that deliberates on a case-by-case basis, without rigid rules and without the veto that currently paralyzes the UN. Charles Kupchan, the professor who puts forward this idea, points out that this is already how things work — even if no one openly admits it. Think of the diplomacy that stopped the war in the Balkans in the 1990s: it was not handled by the UN, but by a small group of major powers that found a compromise away from the spotlight. Or consider the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, led by the P5+1: a few key players, outside the official buildings. And in fact, many of today's crises — from Sudan to Gaza — are managed by “coalitions of the willing,” ad hoc groups that form, act, and then disband. A curious detail: the history of the “Concert of Europe” in the 19th century, which, after the Napoleonic Wars, maintained peace for decades without written statutes but with informal meetings among the great powers. The trick? No one asked others to become equal — monarchies and democracies worked together on what was needed, and they left everything else outside the room. Today, Kupchan says, this is precisely what is needed: to accept that the world is multipolar and culturally diverse, and to stop expecting everyone to adopt the same political or economic standards. Examples abound: nearly two-thirds of European trade remains within the Union, more than half of Asian trade takes place between countries in the same region, and Africa is building its political identity on its pan-African heritage. But there is also a less reassuring side: if we do not learn to govern this plurality, we risk more wars, because history teaches us that great moments of international order come only after enormous crises — from the Peace of Westphalia, which emerged after a century of religious wars, to the UN, created on the ruins of World War II. This time, the challenge is to devise a new order BEFORE it is too late. But be careful: the concert system is not a magic wand. It will not eliminate conflicts of interest between major powers, nor will it solve problems like climate change through goodwill alone. But it does offer a platform where differences do not paralyze everything — and where regions can manage their own priorities, from the fight against poverty in Africa to drug trafficking in Latin America, without waiting for someone in New York or Beijing to give permission. The less obvious perspective? Accepting that regionalization will also lead to new “spheres of influence,” less brutal than those of the past but still decisive. And that to avoid the worst — such as Russia feeling threatened by its neighbors, or China being tempted to overextend its influence — the great powers must limit themselves to coordinating, not invading. In short, the future of the world order will be neither the triumph of the UN nor the return of empires. It will be a permanent jam session between regions and powers, with flexible rules, groups that form and disband, and no one in charge. If this idea seems strange to you, remember: the alternative is the paralysis that we already see every day. If, after reading this story, you realize that thinking of the world order as an orchestra, and not a pyramid, changes the way you watch the news, you can mark it on Lara Notes with I'm In — you can choose whether it's just an interest, something you've experienced, or a conviction. And if, in a few days' time, you find yourself telling someone the anecdote of the Concert of Europe or this new idea of a geopolitical jam session, you can go back to Lara Notes and tag those who were there: Shared Offline says that conversation mattered. This Note comes from Foreign Policy and saves you 20 minutes of reading.