There Is Only One Sphere of Influence

When the United States captured Maduro in Venezuela and Trump publicly talked about buying Greenland, many said: Here we go again with spheres of influence, the old logic of the great powers. But here's the incredible thing: today, there is only one true sphere of influence in the world, and that is the American sphere. We have not returned to the past, but to an asymmetry never seen before: the United States dominates the entire Western Hemisphere, while Russia and China cannot even control their own backyards. The prevailing argument is that the world has once again become multipolar. But if you look at the numbers, it’s an illusion. A true sphere of influence is measured as follows: neighboring countries align themselves in terms of security, external rivals cannot intervene on an equal footing, and control is maintained without the need for constant use of force. Only the United States meets all three conditions. In the rest of the world, every territory is contested. Take the military figures: the U.S. spends up to 12 times more on defense than all the other countries in the Americas combined. They have nearly 3,000 combat aircraft, more than 120 warships, and around 65 submarines. All of Latin America, from Mexico to Argentina, combined has fewer than 700 aircraft, around 30 ships, and about 20 submarines. Even Canada, which is the exception, has a limited force: half of its units are often out of service due to maintenance or staff shortages, and without the United States, it could not even manage basic logistics. In practice, the regional armed forces function as support for the U.S., not as rivals. And it's not just a matter of weapons: the economic ties are even closer. Nearly half of South America’s exports, and 60% to 80% of those from Canada and Mexico, go to the U.S. market. These are not goods that can be traded anywhere: they are components of a supply chain, produced specifically for the U.S. If you lose that market, you can’t just move elsewhere: the economy collapses. And the dollar is the reference currency for almost the entire region: in times of crisis, countries turn to Washington. China and Russia? They offer deals, not systems. Beijing builds roads and bridges, but in return, it wants resources and data, and it offers non-transparent loans. Moscow sells weapons and raw materials, but it doesn't offer a model that anyone dreams of emulating. Neither country can protect its allies when Washington decides to intervene, as we saw when Maduro was deposed. But the most compelling aspect is the stories of those who would like to emulate America but fail to do so. Take Russia: It threw all its conventional might at Ukraine, mobilized its economy, its army, and its allies, and over more than a decade, it gained only 50 kilometers of territory, at the cost of 1.2 million lives. Meanwhile, its former satellite states are growing faster without Moscow than with it. In 1990, a Russian was twice as wealthy as a Pole; today, a Pole is 70% wealthier than a Russian. China is strong, but it operates in the world's most challenging neighborhood: it borders seven of the fifteen most populous nations, four nuclear powers, and has territorial disputes with at least ten countries. When it tries to buy influence, it often only provokes a backlash: in Asia, imports from China have skyrocketed, and many governments are now seeking to protect their local industries. And the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s grand infrastructure strategy, is producing more insolvent debtors than stable allies: 60% of China’s loans abroad have gone to countries in financial crisis. If China invaded Taiwan, it would likely destroy the semiconductor industry, leaving itself with ruin, not wealth. Here lies the turnaround: American superiority is not just a matter of power, but of position and system. The United States has a backyard that no one else can claim. This gives Washington two advantages: the power to intervene anywhere and the security of being able to disengage when necessary, leaving others to worry about nearby threats. However, this also creates risks. The adversaries—Putin and Xi—feel they have been demoted. Putin cannot accept that his former vassals are better off without him. Xi views the American structure as an obstacle to Beijing’s rise: the international system is designed to prevent the emergence of new regional powers. The paradox is that this American security can lead to two opposing mistakes: on the one hand, the temptation to abandon the global order in order to tend only to one’s own backyard; on the other, the underestimation of real threats until they erupt. There is a clear historical precedent: in the 1930s, the U.S. distanced itself from European and Asian conflicts, but then had to intervene in the midst of war. After the Cold War, the U.S. expanded NATO without offering real guarantees, thereby irritating Moscow without providing true deterrence. Today, the U.S. risks doing the same: it is wavering between disengagement and resistance, without truly preparing for military and economic deterrence. Meanwhile, in the event of a real war, ammunition stocks would be depleted within a few weeks. But something is changing: allied countries, especially those most exposed to Moscow and Beijing, are seriously rearming. Since 2019, military spending by European NATO members has increased by 50%, especially in Eastern European countries. In Asia, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Australia are strengthening their defenses and opening U.S. bases. Production chains are also shifting: less investment in China, more in India, Vietnam, and Mexico. Here is the crux of the matter: the true strength of the American sphere lies not in dominating by force, but in being the reference point that others cannot afford to lose. If Washington treats its partners as allies rather than as subordinates, it can consolidate a resilient order. If, on the other hand, it closes itself off, it risks fueling the very wars of restoration it seeks to avoid. Ultimately, the question is: Will the United States use its unique position to strengthen the global order, or will it merely exploit its current advantage? A closed sphere declines; an open sphere multiplies power. The world is not multipolar: there is only one sphere, and everyone else is playing away from home. If you were surprised to learn that the real anomaly is not the return of the blocs but the existence of a single sphere of influence, on Lara Notes you can mark this idea with I'm In: it's not a like; it's your way of saying that this perspective is now yours too. And the next time you happen to discuss the new Cold War with someone, you can tag them with Shared Offline on Lara Notes—because conversations that change the way you see the world deserve to be remembered. That was Foreign Affairs, and you've saved yourself nearly forty minutes of reading.